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Language as a political issue:  
The case of language of command 




The paper shows the political crisis of dualism in a multinational Austro-Hungary 
that was initiated by the political opposition of the Magyar magnates in the Hun-
garian Parliament. It was initiated by the large land owners-magnates with the 
claim to introduce the Magyar language as the language of command within the 
Hungarian army. The claim implicated the split of the united army and dispute of 
the joint chief commander, the Emperor Francis Joseph. The issue of the Magyar 
language was, for this reason, primarily a political question that subsequently 
meant the further weakening of political ties with the western half of the Monar-
chy until the complete separation of Hungary. The Emperor opposed this, an-
nouncing a new electoral law that would put an end to the dominance of the Mag-
yar minority over the non-Magyar majority in Hungary. He was supported by the 
Liberal party headed by István Tisza, who was correct in his assessment that dual-
ism primarily protected the Magyar interests in Hungary. The fear of the new 
electoral law sobered the Magyar nationalists and they gave upon the idea of re-
vising the Austrian-Hungarian Ausgleich. The Emperor subsequently gave up the 
implementation of the law on the general right to vote in Hungary, led by direct 
political interests, despite the fact that a law like this, under favorable political 
circumstances which unfortunately were not present, could have become the fu-
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The division of the Austrian Empire to the Austrian and Hungarian parts oc-
curred in 1867 by the so-called Ausgleich, or rather, alignment. The dualism 
was, first of all, an “agreement” between Emperor Francis Joseph I and the 
Magyars. The Magyars agreed that the military1 and foreign affairs would come 
under the competence of the common greater state, and the Emperor would re-
sign control of Hungary’s interior matters to the Magyars. The Magyars also 
agreed that Hungary had to be in the customs union with other parts of the Em-
pire and the union would be renewed every ten years. In this way, three organi-
zational forms were made: the permanent common Monarchy (that presented it-
self as a strong Habsburg power to the foreigners), the temporary Austro-
Hungarian economic union, and two separate states, Austria and Hungary. The 
Dual Monarchy had a common ruler, a Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a Minis-
ter of War. There was no common government or common Prime Minister. The 
Dual Monarchy, however, had its constitutional term in the form of Austrian and 
Hungarian delegations of sixty members each that had separate sessions.2 The 
                                                 
1 The Ausgleich hold over the undivided joint army. Hungary agreed to it only at the cost of 
founding its own Home Guard which led Austria to do the same. The three military organiza-
tions with separate Ministries – one for the joint army and two for Home Guards – depended 
upon three Parliaments: the Austrian, the Hungarian and the joint, which reflected negatively 
upon the development of the military forces of the Monarchy. According to the 1869 Law, the 
military forces were divided to the Imperial and Regal armies and the Navy. The joint army 
with German as the language of command was subordinate to the Ministry of War in peace 
time; the Regal-Hungarian Home Guard with Magyar as the language of command and the 
Regal-Croatian Home Guard with Croatian as the language of command were both subordi-
nate to the Hungarian Ministry of Defense; the Imperial-Regal Home Guard in countries rep-
resented in the Imperial Council with German as the language of command was subordinate 
to the Austrian Ministry of Defense. More on this: Vojna Enciklopedija (1970: 333–337). 
2 The Upper House in Hungary voted for twenty members by direct vote, and one of them had 
to be a Croat. The Lower House voted forty members by the direct vote, too, four of them 
were voted for by the Croatian members of the House. In Austria, twenty members of the 
delegation voted directly for the members of the Upper House, and forty voted in the Lower 
House through elective collegiums of different provinces—in accordance with the size of the 
 
 
               353
13.2 (2012): 351-371 
Hungarian delegation represented the integral state of Hungary with a symbolic 
acknowledgment of Croatia, and the Austrian delegation was the latest version 
of the Parliament of classes, the dreamland of the conservatives.3 The Hungary 
part, although it comprised only two-fifths of the population, paid only one-third 
of taxes to the Monarchy, while it had the equal status in bringing decisions. 
(Taylor 1990: 166-168) The operation of the delegations’ only role was to de-
bate, which was to the Emperor’s liking because he maintained the final say. 
Economic issues were not left to the Emperor to decide. Such issues were decid-
ed about by the direct negotiations of both Parliaments. The biggest economic 
problem centered on deciding the “quote,” i.e. the participation in common ex-
penses and the customs policies connected with it. In the beginning, Hungary 
participated with a quote of only 30%, which was later raised to 34.4%. This 
was regulated by the customs policies that increasingly preferred Hungarian in-
terests. The Austrian part of the Monarchy was developing into an industrial re-
gion that depended on inexpensive food from Hungary, which protected it by 
high customs taxes. This was the reason why each ten-year economic agreement 
between Austria and Hungary provoked a difficult political crisis that questioned 
the very foundations of the common state.  
 
The new Hungary was formed as a unitary state, regardless of the majority 
non-Magyar population that expected the interior autonomy within the frame of 
dualism (Galántai 1967: 146). The dualism, however, envisaged only the bal-
ance between the two strongest nations which, without an overall solution to the 
national issue, could not be a solid foundation upon which the future of the Dual 
Monarchy could be built. (Galántai 1967: 148) Only Croatia made the Agree-
ment in 1868 which, as opposed to Austrian-Hungarian Ausgleich, was not an al-
liance of two equal partners but quite the contrary, because Croatia was in a 
submissive position in all important issues.4 Although the Emperor managed to 
crush the Magyar rebellion with the help of the Croatian army headed by Josip 
                                                                                                                                                        
province (from twenty delegates for Czech to one delegate for Tyrol, i.e. Voralberg) (Taylor 
1990: 167) 
3 The Austrian Germans and the Magyar Hungarians had a different notion of their position in 
“their” respective parts of the Monarchy, as well as the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich. For 
Germans, the Ausgleich was a necessity, but also no reason to challenge it. The majority did 
not feel members of the unified Habsburg Empire and the guarantors of its safety. The Mag-
yars, however, identified themselves exclusively with the Hungarian-Magyar state and they 
felt the two terms as a whole. The Ausgleich was, for all classes of the Magyar population, 
more or less a necessity. They, however, were politically focused upon the Hungarian King-
dom, and not the Habsburg Empire. (Kann 1962: 153) 
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Jelai in 1848, he was forced to leave to the Magyars the exclusive rights to 
steer relationships with Croatia after he had suffered defeat in the war with Prus-
sia in 1866. The hope was that the agreement with the Magyars would preserve 
the unity of the Monarchy. This was why the Croatian “autonomy” provided on-
ly for autonomous decision making in the fields of education and language. The 
Croatian Governor was appointed by the Emperor, but upon the suggestion of 
the Hungarian Prime Minister and a handful of Croatian members of Parliament 
(40) in the Hungarian Parliament, could at any time be outvoted (Kann 1964: 
131). 
 
At the beginning of 20th century, Hungary had a population of 20 million with 
less than ten million Magyars. The majority of the population was made up of 
Slovaks, Romanians, Serbs, Croats, Germans, and Bulgarians. In the Austrian 
part of the Empire, the situation was similar. Out of a population of 28 million, 
Germans made up only ten million. The rest of the population consisted of all 
nationalities of Central Europe: Poles, Rusyns, Rumanians, Czechs, Slovenes, 
Italians, Croats, and Serbs. Although Slavic nations prevailed in the mosaic, 
they did not show solidarity.5  
 
The Dual Monarchy was begun as a compound of two constitutional states, 
one of which was based on German and the other upon the Magyar hegemony. 
Behind the constitutional curtain, however, there was the Habsburg Monarchy 
—the Empire whose ruler gave up a part of his prerogatives in internal affairs, 
but numerous unsolved problems enabled him an endless area for manouvering 
and protecting the supreme authority.6  
                                                 
5 There were about two million Slovaks in the Hungarian part at the northern border; three 
million Romanians in Transylvania; around one million Serbs in Timisoara Banat and the Da-
nube valley; more than two million Croats in Croatia and Slavonia. Transylvanian Germans 
(Saxon) and Bulgarians were relatively few. In the Austrian part of Galicia lived a little bit 
less than five million Poles and three million Rusyns. There were around six and a half mil-
lion Czechs; there were more than one million Slovenes in Styria, Carinthia, Crain and Istria; 
south Tyrol and Istria was home to around 700,000 Italians; more than 700,000 Croats and 
Serbs lived in Istria and the Adriatic coast. More in Renouvin (2008: 75–79) and Kardum 
(2009: 21–23). 
6 More on creation of dualism in Austro-Hungary 1866–67 see Taylor (1990: 161–173). 
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2. Dualist Hungary 
At the beginning of the 20th century, there were simultaneous political crises in 
both Austria and Hungary provoked by civil nationalism. The crisis in Austria 
was a result of the industrial development; in Hungary it was the result of the 
deterioration of agriculture. 
 
The capitulation of Emperor Francis Joseph I to Hungary in 1867, i.e. his ac-
ceptance of the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich, had a paradoxical effect upon 
Hungary: the Magyar gentry achieved political success at the moment of its eco-
nomic collapse. The process began in 1848 with the abolishment of statute labor, 
and reached its peak with the purchasing of inexpensive American grain. Their 
land was taken over by large landowners (magnates) who did not have problems 
with the abolishment of statute labor because they could withstand the global 
competitions due to their capitalistic approach to agrarian production. In the pe-
riod from 1867 until the end of the century, more than 100,000 independent 
landowners disappeared and more than one-third of Hungary came under the di-
rection of the magnates, with one-fifth of ownership in the hands of only three 
hundred families (Taylor 1990: 229). 
 
The gentry without land were saved from complete disappearance by the new 
character of the Hungarian state that required a large administration. In 1867, 
Hungary was organized after the Austrian model as a huge bureaucratic organi-
zation with state railways, a state post office, and state health and education sys-
tems. The landless gentry found employment in the state administration and was 
existentially identified with centralized Hungary. At the beginning of 20th centu-
ry, the bureaucratic apparatus employed around 250,000 Magyar gentry. They 
had only basic administrative experience in their counties but were qualified for 
the positions by the very fact that they were the Magyars. Faced with the compe-
tition of other nationalities, they feared implementing the 1868 Law on Nation-
alities. On the contrary, to safeguard their privileged position, knowledge of the 
Magyar language was required from all inhabitants in Hungary. In this way, they 
managed to disable the political affirmation of other nationalities, evict their few 
representatives from the Parliament, condemn their organizations, and complete-
ly monopolize state administration positions and free professions. 95% of state 
employees, 92% of county employees, 89% of physicians, and 90% of judges 
were Magyars at the beginning of 20th century.7  
                                                 
7 The Croatian Parliament was also helpless. The railway company, controlled from Budapest, 
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The Magyar nationalism was not exclusive. Aware of their minority, the 
Magyars successfully attracted to their side the few intellectuals of other Hun-
garian nationalities. They were most successful with Germans, who gained a 
dominant position in industry and trade, and with Jews, who were the major de-
fenders of the “assimilation” (Taylor 1990: 231-232). 
 
The ardent nationalism of the Magyar gentry was not only the means of pro-
tecting the monopoly on the administrative positions, but also its new and deci-
sive weapon in an endless fight with the magnates. As opposed to the gentry, 
who had always had a tensions relationship with the dynasty, the magnates— 
cosmopolite courtiers with large real property—tried to negotiate with the Habs-
burgs. This became an obvious pattern beginning in 1848. The gentry took the 
side of Lajos Kossuth, while the magnates turned their back on him. After 1867, 
the situation reversed and the magnates became independent large agrarian capi-
talists and the gentry did not only pine in their counties, but entered the state of-
fices upon which it depended. Due to this change of circumstances, the gentry 
needed stronger relationships with the Habsburgs to protect the power of the 
Hungarian state and their own existence. This was why they were willing to pay 
their freedom by respecting the prerogatives of the Crown in matters of military 
and foreign affairs. (Taylor 1990: 237) The symbol of the change and the true 
creator of the new Hungary was Koloman Tisza, who became the Hungarian 
Prime Minister in 1875. For the next twenty-five years, during which his party 
ruled, he was an obedient servant of Francis Joseph. 
 
Tisza and his followers could not have managed to survive only by protecting 
their interests because Kossuth’s ideas deeply permeated the national feeling of 
the Magyar that was bitterly tested on the troubled experience in the period 
1849-1867. The constant pursuit of nationalities was necessary to Tisza and his 
followers as evidence that they were good Magyars, despite their loyalty to the 
Emperor. The voters in central Hungary, with its majority of the Magyar popula-
tion, persistently followed Kossuth’s ideas. To prevent this, Tisza resorted to a 
special “election geometry”—the creation of, on one hand, large electoral coun-
ties with 10,000 of Magyar voters and, on the other hand, small electoral units of 
as few as 250 voters in areas dominantly populated by national minorities. Since 
only few knew the Magyar language in those areas, the decision depended upon 
                                                                                                                                                        
weakening of Croatia by Hungarian preventing of railroad connection of Zagreb and Vienna, 
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only a few Magyar officials. Owing to these “pocket counties,” the Hungarian 
monopoly was successfully kept over the non-Magyar populations. 
 
The “brilliant” system upset the magnates’ plans because they had believed 
that dualism was going to guarantee them high positions which were accompa-
nied by honors and privileges. Their position, however, was taken over by the 
hardworking and less demanding gentry that ruled the magnates out of power 
with the help of the Emperor. The magnates were cosmopolitan by upbringing 
and were looked upon as traitors of Hungarian independence. Now they were 
devoid of their traditional influence on the court and were left only to focus on 
policies of patriotism in the field of foreign affairs, i.e. the fight against the dyn-
asty. This was the only field in which Tisza could not compete with them, the 
same as they could not overplay him in the policies of magyarization that he 
conducted in such an unrelenting way.  
 
Tisza and the gentry became defenders of dualism, while the representatives 
of the magnates, headed by Gulag Andrassy (the Constitutional Party), Albert 
Apponyi (the National Party) and the count Aladar Zichy (the Catholic Peoples 
Party) (Trumbi 1936: 62) stood for “personal union,” and demanded that Hun-
gary had its own army that would indirectly imply that they could steer their 
own foreign policy (although Lajos Kossuth had long ago given up the program 
and backed the Danube Confederation without the Habsburgs) (Taylor 1990: 
240). There was no idea of the complete separation from Austria and the Habs-
burgs because it was obvious that the fight for independence would also incite 
democratic elements of the non-Magyar peoples for their autonomy or self-
government. They simply wanted to obtain new privileges in military and dip-
lomatic affairs. (Jászi 1964: 358) 
 
The real reason for the strong patriotism of the magnates was the fear from 
possible consequences of the crisis that got hold of the agrarian and reached its 
peak by the end of 19th century. Faced with the farmers’ rebellion and endan-
gered by the alliance of farming hands, the magnates channeled the revolt 
against this class towards the court. They claimed that the main cause of all 
problems in Hungary was German language as a language of command in the 
Austrian-Hungarian army. At that time, such a policy was possible because the 
direct danger of the exterior enemy was removed by signing the agreement be-
tween Austria-Hungary and Russia in 1897, the enemy that both Germans and 
Magyars feared. As soon as there was no Russian threat from the east, the mag-
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3. Monarchy in crisis 
The crisis began in the Austrian part of the Dual Monarchy because the ruling 
Germans could not accept the decree that named Czech and German the lan-
guages of “internal offices” which meant they had lost their monopoly on offi-
cial positions throughout Czech region. The Austrian Germans could not pre-
serve Austria as a German national state and, at the same time they did not want 
it to transform into the supranational entity. The crisis in Austria opened door to 
the crisis in the whole Empire.8 After the fall of the Prime Minister of the Aus-
trian government, the count Kazimir Badeni in November 1897, the constitu-
tional authority in Austria collapsed which freed the Magyar magnates of any 
fear that the unified Austria would mobilize against them. At the same time, the 
Imperial Council transgressed and the new customs agreement could not be vot-
ed out. This meant that the old agreement would be in force until 1903. This was 
a pretext for new formal concessions to Hungary. Due to the chaos that pre-
vailed in Austria at the time, it seemed that the elderly Emperor could not op-
pose attacks on dualism; a hard campaign against the unitary army was soon ini-
tiated. 
 
The Emperor knew that the Monarchy was necessary for “ruling peoples” if 
they wanted to maintain their hegemony and upper-class ways and that he could 
make them compliant by withholding support. It was the threat that he retorted 
to only in the utmost necessity (Jászi 1964: 360). 
 
After the death of Lajos Kossuth in 1894 and ceremonial return of his body to 
Budapest, his son Ferenz Kossuth became the leader of the Independent Party 
and the agitation against dualism took on dramatic, almost revolutionary propor-
tions. After more pronounced and open claims for the total independence of 
Hungary, and because the revolutionaries claimed that Hungary had the right to 
annul the Ausgleich from 1867 at all times, the Emperor Francis Joseph had to 
abandon his reconciling policies. In the beginning, the Emperor resisted the di-
vision of power, but when a form of government was found that seemed to him 
acceptable and that promised eventual success, he stood for the Ausgleich firmly 
                                                 
8 These two privileged nations did not realize that the third crisis germinated in the spririts of 
a few Croatian intelectuals as a result of the Habsburg’s betrayal of Croatia and the Magyar 
opression of Croatia. In ten years, the Southern Slavic issue will overshadow both constitu-
tional confusion in Austria and ferment in Hungary. In twenty years, the Habsburg dynasty, 
the hegemony of Germans and the Greater Hungary will crush down the challenges of the 
Yugoslavism issue. (Taylor 1990: 241)  
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and unyieldingly. He considered any aberration from the agreement both treason 
and a crime (Wandruszka and Urbanitsch 1975: 61). 
 
The Dual Monarchy faced its most serious crisis since 1848. The Emperor 
was much more affected by the Hungarian crisis than the one in Austria because 
it endangered the foundations of Austro-Hungarian survival (Tschuppik 1928: 
247). The attack upon the unitary army was also an attack upon the Emperor as 
the commanding leader of the army; after all, military issues were of the utmost 
importance for both the Emperor and the heir to the throne, Francis Ferdinand. 
(Stöller 1942: 4) The army was a symbol of the Emperor and King’s military 
power. Such a high opinion for the army had its roots in the Emperor’s youth, 
when the Monarchy was saved in 1848, thanks in large part to the army. Next to 
it, the later alliance with Germany was founded on the fact that Germany had the 
most powerful army in Europe at the time. Francis Joseph himself dreamed 
about the role of a successful military strategist, but he had to accept the fact that 
the dream would never be fulfilled. Despite that, he believed that the unity and 
homogeneity of the Austro-Hungarian army should not be endangered at any 
cost and that the language of command had to be a single one, i.e. German. Such 
an unbending view by the Emperor was supported by the fact that he was raised 
as a soldier and he was comfortable only in performing his military duties. Until 
his death he personally signed all military decrees, regardless of whether they 
concerned simply the cut and the color of the uniforms (Wandruszka and 
Urbanitsch 1975: 62). 
 
The Austro-Hungarian army had a special problem in communication due to 
its multinational composition. Although the language of command was German, 
soldiers who were not of German origin did not speak German. The problem 
was solved by publishing military handbooks in Czech, Croatian, Polish, Roma-
nian, Slovak and Magyar languages and was aimed at officers to enable them to 
communicate with their subordinates.9 The Emperor himself could fluently 
speak the languages of his Monarchy and was aware that the national question 
was the most difficult internal political question of the Dual Monarchy. Alt-
hough he never gave preference to Germans—quite the contrary, he always took 
care that servants in the government10 were represented by as many other Aus-
tro-Hungarian nationalities as possible—the Emperor saw “his” nations only as 
                                                 
9 Seidels Militär-Sprachbücher (1902). 
10 The members of the Austrian government were mainly the members of the top state bu-
reaucracy while the leading politicians belonged to the court or regional nobility. As a rule, 
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the populations of different regions, and not as different nationalities 
(Wandruszka and Urbanitsch 1975: 64). 
 
The sore spot of the Austro-Hungarian army was a thumping defeat in the war 
with Prussia in 1866 at Königgratz. The defeat resulted in a handful of major in-
ternal political consequences due to the future agreement with the Magyars. In 
wartime circumstances, Austria highly appreciated not only Hungarian loyalty, 
but also its active support against the exterior enemy. The loyalty of the upper-
class was unquestionable and provided a satisfactory agreement with the gov-
ernment in Vienna; however, the lower-classes did not share the same sentiment. 
They were only expected and asked to give war sacrifices and could not expect 
any direct benefits. There was even some fear that they might use the arms not 
against Prussia but for completely different purposes. This was why the authori-
ties in Vienna were willing to make agreements with the Magyars because if the 
war with Prussia lasted longer, Magyar radicalism could only become stronger. 
The Magyar ruling authorities used the war with Prussia to reorganize the Mon-
archy on the principle of duality, but only to the extent of not endangering the 
total strength of the Monarchy in order to safeguard their interests and privileges 
that they won. Ausgleich had a primary role to ensure the Magyars in Hungary 
the support against aspirations of other nationalities to get rid of the Magyar he-
gemony. The same policies were used by Austrian Germans in their part of the 
Monarchy (Galántai 1967: 148-152). The Habsburg Monarchy was saved in the 
war with Prussia only due to Bismarck’s wisdom and moderateness, and not due 
to their own power. Austro-Hungary indeed stayed outside the great German 
Reich, but it had the status of the inferior ally by the end of its existence because 
it had, for good reason, the support of the Magyars. 
4. The language of command in the Hungarian army 
The dramatic events of 1903 led Emperor Francis Joseph to take energetic 
moves. The problem lied in the fact that the number of draftees in the Austro-
Hungarian army was diminishing over the previous few years. Due to the politi-
cal circumstances in the Monarchy, no War Minister had the courage to suggest 
the enlargement of draftee quotes in either the Austrian or Hungarian Parlia-
ments, although the military command had problems reinforcing old and new 
military formations for years. The existing quotes did not follow the population 
rise and the government asked in the new defense bill to raise the quote for 
23,000 draftees per year. The Austrian part of the Monarchy, including Czech, 
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adopted the Emperor’s requirement, but the Independent Party in Hungary be-
lieved that it was the right moment to ask for the introduction of the Magyar 
language as a language of command in Hungarian units.11 The question of lan-
guage in this case was in no way a cultural or linguistic problem. The Magyar 
language not only was not subordinate to German, but had a superior status rela-
tive to other peoples’ languages in Hungary due to the policies of magyarization 
in Hungary. The language question, in this case, was exclusively a political 
question, with the aim to loosen the last bond with the common state and pro-
vide, in the long run, the independence of Hungary ruled by the Magyars. The 
Emperor could not accept the claim, but there was also another factor12 that 
would make Kossuthists’ claim hard to implement. Hungarian corps had 17 
Croatian regiments and Croats would take up arms at the first command in the 
Magyar language (Tschuppik 1928: 468). Despite all of this, Kossuth’s party or-
ganized a strong obstruction in the Hungarian Parliament which led to the Em-
peror’s energetic defense of the army as a common institution that could not be 
questioned. 
 
After the fall of the liberal government in Hungary, the Emperor appointed 
Earl Khuen-Hedervary the new Prime Minister. Khuen-Hedervary had the image 
of a “strong politician” because he, as a Croatian Governor, managed to control 
the growing Croatian opposition by using political corruption, force, and the 
granting of privileges to Serbs. The Emperor hoped Khuen-Hedervary could 
control Kossuth’s party, too (Redlich 1929: 402). Khuen-Hedervary, however, 
was not as successful in this task. The obstruction not only continued but ended 
in the streets with a contagious effect on other parts of the Monarchy. Rebellions 
took over in Prague, Innsbruck, and even Vienna. Khuen- Hedervary backed off 
and advised the Emperor to call off the bill on recruitment. The Emperor obliged 
but with an aching heart. This put the Austrian Prime Minister Ernest von 
Koerber into a difficult position and he had to resign because he stood for the 
idea that the bill was necessary and that it could not be rejected. Khuen also did 
                                                 
11 “They endorsed such demands of the Opposition as the compulsory transfer of Hungarian 
officers to Hungarian regiments and the weeding out of Austrians from Hungarian units; the 
easing of the German language requirement for Hungarian officer candidates; the training of 
Hungarian cadets exclusively in Hungarian military schools; the recognition of Hungarian as 
an official military language; and the use of the Hungarian flag and insignia in Hungarian 
units.” See Deák (1992: 69). 
12  There were not enough Hungarian officers to command all the units originating from 
Hungary. The non-Magyar career officers who happened to be Hungarian citizens were for 
the largest part Germans, and most of them had no desire to transfer to a Hungarian unit, nor 
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not last long and the Emperor appointed István Tisza (the son of Koloman Ti-
sza) as the new Hungarian Prime Minister. Although the Emperor called off the 
recruitment bill, he sent a message to his army from Chlopy in Galicia, where he 
attended military maneuvers in which he explicitly confirmed his determination 
that the army must stay integral and that he would never give up his rights of a 
chief commander. “My army should know that I shall never give up my duties 
and my rights that are bestowed to me as a supreme commander. My army must 
stay unitary and common as it is now, powerful to defend the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy from enemies wherever they might come from…” (Bibl 1937: 429) 
The Emperor’s message met major approval in Austria (with the exception of 
the radical Czech element); however, in Hungary it provoked a storm of bitter-
ness among the Magyar intelligentsia.13 A newspaper campaign was brought to a 
fever pitch. This is why Tisza’s Liberal Party, in fear of further radicalization of 
Kossuthists, made a compromise regarding the military program in favor of the 
Hungarian army. This was accepted and only slightly revised by the Emperor. 
He was 73 (in 1903) and signs of old age began to hinder him from performing 
his duties for the first time. 
 
Tisza managed to persuade the Magyar opposition for the compromised bill, 
which ended in a short-lasting truce in March 1904. As early as the next year, 
the Independent Party continued to obstruct parliamentary proceedings, which 
led to the cessation of work of the Parliament and, eventually, the dissolution of 
the Parliament. Tisza was undoubtedly a Magyar patriot who wanted to acquire 
the biggest concessions for the Magyars from the Emperor; but he nevertheless 
did not want to jeopardize the dualistic structure that meant not only a privileged 
position in Hungary but also guaranteed a major influence over the general poli-
cies of the Monarchy.14 The Emperor had a special appreciation for Tisza alt-
hough he did not agree with him at all times. He, however, had always consulted 
him and rarely, if ever, disregarded Tisza’s advice. 
 
                                                 
13 The Emperor stated in his Army order also that: “My entire armed forces... are imbued 
with that spirit of unity and harmony which respects every national characteristic and is able 
to solve all antagonisms so to utilize the individual qualities of each ethnic group for the bene-
fit of all.” The term “ethnic group” was translated into Hungarian as “tribal group”, which 
was for the Hungarians an unforgivable insult because they were not treated as a sovereign 
nation in equal partnership with Austria. See Deák (1992: 69). 
14  Tisza’s policy was seen in Austria as manifestation of Magyar chauvinism, and in Hun-
gary as an abject surrender to Austrian policy. Cf. Deák (1992: 70) 
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Tisza decided to end the political agony in a radical manner. He proposed 
honest elections without political corruption that was customary in Hungary. 
The move was a risky one, but in January 1905, the only free and fair elections 
were held. Tisza’s Liberal Party was defeated utterly and a new government was 
formed by a coalition of parties that opposed dualism, led by the Kossuth’s In-
dependent Party. The political scene was again dangerously radicalized because 
the new parliamentary majority asked for the Magyar language to be the lan-
guage of command in the Hungarian army. It was an unambiguous claim for 
separation of the Hungarian army from the common Austro-Hungarian army 
(Kann 1962: 136). Since more than half of the Hungarian army consisted of Slo-
vak, Rumanian, Croat, and German military formations, the claim manifested 
the will of the Magyars that the Hungarian army should become yet another 
means for the magyarization in non-Magyar parts of Hungary. 
 
The Emperor had to face the thirty-six year long indifference for the position 
of the non-Magyar majority in Hungary that was left completely to 
magyarization because he was aware that the Magyar approval of Ausgleich was 
conditioned (although it was not directly stated) by their unlimited rule in Hun-
gary.15 Now the long-term protection of Magyar hegemony came due in the 
form of opposition to the Emperor’s condition to the Ausgleich, i.e. that the ar-
my stayed unitary and exclusively under his command (Redlich 1929: 404). 
Embittered by the position of the Magyar nobility, Francis Joseph decided for a 
decisive move for which he had the support not only of the officers’ choir, but 
his generals as well. He broke the constitutional practice and appointed General 
Geza Fejervary, a man loyal to the Emperor, as the new Hungarian Prime Minis-
ter. Despite the fact that Fejervary enjoyed popularity among the Magyars, his 
negotiations with the representatives of the winning coalition did not yield suc-
cess because they did not want to abandon their condition to overtake the duty 
only if Hungary got its own army. 
 
                                                 
15 “Once the Dual monarchy was set up, signifying Hungary’s total victory over the centraliz-
ing Germans in Vienna, the Magyars did everything in their power to strengthen the rule of 
German liberals over the other half of the Empire... They did this because they believed, cor-
rectly, that any concessions made by Vienna to the subject-nations in her half of the monarchy 
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The Emperor showed his hesitance very clearly when he invited the repre-
sentatives of the winning coalition16 into the audience to read them in conspicu-
ously brief manner the conditions they had to accept if they wanted to form the 
new government. However, this gesture did not influence the policies of the coa-
lition. They refused the negotiations with the common Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs because he was not a Magyar. The negotiations with the Emperor’s author-
ized representative, Count Cziraki did not yield any positive result. This was 
why the Emperor authorized General Fejervary to form a non-parliamentary 
government in which the Minister of the Interior became Joseph Kristoffy, a 
man almost entirely anonymous to Hungarians. Despite the fact that Kristoffy 
was a Magyar, he supported the introduction of a general right to vote in Hunga-
ry and won over General Fejervary to accept this idea. The general right to vote 
would annul the Magyar hegemony over the majority of non-Magyar peoples in 
Hungary. This was why the Magyar politicians started a vehement campaign 
against it, claiming that it allegedly breached the Constitution and policies of the 
new government. Few, however, expected that simultaneously with the conven-
ing of the Parliament on February 19, 1906, the appointment of the Honvéd17 
General Alexander Nyria would be made as a new King’s commissariat for the 
Hungarian Kingdom. As soon as the President of the Parliament ended the par-
liamentary session, Honvéd colonel Fabricius, accompanied by his troops and 
the police, entered the building of the Parliament and read the decree to absolve 
it.18 Many expected that the Emperor’s move would result in the resistance of 
the Magyar population, as Magyar nationalists announced, but this did not hap-
pen. The Magyars did not want to resort to arms to defend the privileged classes 
                                                 
16 They were: the Counts Gula Andrássy, Albert Apponyi, and Aladar Zichy, the Barons De-
siderius Bánffy and Ferenc Kossuth. 
17 The Hungarian homeguard units. 
18 Both in Austro-Hungary as a unit and in its parts, Austria and Hungary, the Parliament was 
not legally or politically the supreme authority that the executive branch depended upon. The 
Crown governed the legislative part in cooperation with the Parliaments of Austria and Hun-
gary. The governments had to have the trust of the Crown and they governed primarily in the 
interest of the Crown. The governments had to render accounts to the Parliaments only in 
cases of illegal operation of the members of Parliaments, but they did not depend upon the 
support of the parliamentary majority vote. The parliamentary support was always welcome, 
but if it did not occur, they could govern by the Emperor’s decree. In the Austrian part of the 
Monarchy, such a practice became a rule due to the constant parliamentary obstruction. In 
Hungary, the limitation of the electoral law enabled the safe Magyar parliamentary majority 
and the parliamentary crisis was much less likely. When this happened in 1905, however, the 
Emperor did not hesitate to dissolve the Parliament and appoint a technical government that 
did not have the support of the parliamentary majority (Kann 1964: 158). 
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in the incomplete Hungarian Parliament. It seemed as if the road to the peaceful 
restructuring of national and social structure of feudal Hungary had been set. 
This, however, proved to be just an illusion (Kann 1964: 136). 
 
As early as July, Kristoffy made public the bill on the general and direct right 
to vote for parliamentary elections in Hungary. The announcement brought the 
winning coalition to reason. They abandoned completely their claims for the in-
troduction of the Magyar language as the language of command in the Hungari-
an army. They were aware that otherwise they would not get the Emperor’s ap-
proval to take power. They signed an agreement with Fejervary that also fea-
tured their promise that they would conduct electoral reforms when they take 
power. The promise, however, was all they managed. The new government, 
headed by Alexander Wekerle, did not attempt to introduce the promised elec-
toral reforms in the next three years, and the Emperor did not insist upon it. The 
new electoral law had the purpose of breaking down Magyar nationalists. When 
the goal was achieved, the electoral reform and the revision of the Ausgleich 
were abandoned. Both parties had good reasons for abandoning it. 
 
The Hungarian ruling circles, regardless of whether they belonged to Tisza’s 
liberals or Ferenc Kossuth’s independents, gladly abandoned any variant of revi-
sion of the Ausgleich, fearing the possibility of a social overhaul and national re-
forms that would endanger their dominant position in Hungary. It is obvious that 
the insecure position of the Crown in Hungary was founded exclusively upon 
the joint interests of noblemen, magnates, upper merchant and industrial classes 
in both parts of the Monarchy. The introduction of the general right to vote in 
Hungary could radically change the situation because prevalence would go to 
common farmers and workers of non-Magyar origin. Their support would exclu-
sively depend upon overall change of policies towards the national question and 
far-reaching changes in social and agrarian policies. These would hardly be ac-
cepted by the ruling trade circles, as was seen in the crisis that shook the Austri-
an part of the Monarchy when the general right to vote was introduced in 
1906/07.19 The development would not stop there. Slavic peoples would domi-
                                                 
19 While the unrelenting Magyarization went on in Hungary, there was no Germanization in 
the Austrian part of the Monarchy, anymore. The political crisis in Hungary caused by the 
general right to vote incited some intellectuals in Austria to support the implementation of the 
general right to vote at least in the western part of the Monarchy in order to solve the national 
issue for the future of the country. The Austrian Parliament voted out the motion which 
caused a huge shock and surprise with noblemen and officials on high positions. The Em-
peror, however, decisively supported such a move of the Austrian government, unlike a simi-
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nate in the Hungarian part of the Monarchy and they would ask for the union 
with their kins in the Austrian parts of the Monarchy. The Austro-Hungarian 
Ausgleich would have had to be radically revised and enable that the Habsburg 
Monarchy be transformed into a federal state founded on ethnic criteria. In such 
a scenario, the Crown would have to build its power on the support of the lower 
classes, farmers, and workers of all nationalities and relinquish the support of 
the nobility, industrialists, and centralized public servants, all of whom had 
helped the Crown rule over the previous decades. Such a radical restructuring of 
power could not and should not be introduced, not only because Europe was al-
ready overshadowed by the future war conflict, but also because it was evident 
that numerous Austro-Hungarian nations wished to fulfill their national aspira-
tions outside the borders of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This was why the 
Emperor abandoned the implementation of the general right to vote in Hungary, 
i.e. he was led by direct political interests, despite the fact that a law like this 
one would have become, under the favorable political circumstances which sad-
ly were not present, the future foundation, not for the destruction, but for the 
protection of the Monarchy (Kann 1964: 137–138). 
5. Croatia 
The crisis of dualism and the resistance of the Magyar opposition to the central 
authorities had an impact upon the political circumstances in Croatia. A hope for 
the possible union of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and Istria appeared, followed 
by the occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina that would together form one state with 
Croatian national characteristics. The state would, in agreement with other coun-
tries and peoples of the Monarchy, set common affairs. With this in view, the 
Rijeka and Zadar Resolutions were signed in 1905 by all Croatian parties, both 
from Hungarian and Austrian parts of the Monarchy. They were joined by Ser-
bian parties and the representatives of Italians. The Serbian parties conditioned 
the union from Dalmatia to Croatia and Slavonia by the compulsory acknowl-
edgment of equal status of Serbians and Croats by the Croatians. Everyone 
agreed that each nation had the right to freely and independently decide about its 
fate and that was why they supported the Magyar fight for the state’s independ-
ence, hoping that the already existing rights and freedoms would benefit the 
                                                                                                                                                        
matters of interior political problems in Austria as it was the case in Hungary and he used the 
opportunity to start necessary reforms, hoping that the example of Austria will be followed by 
Hungary, too. (Redlich 1929: 410)  
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Croatian nation, primarily with the union of Croatia and Slavonia with Dalmatia 
(Kardum 1993: 140). The Croatians were, primarily due to their liberalism, an 
easy victim to the Magyar “sweet talk”. Among them, the Magyar gentry sold its 
myth about a liberal Hungary to all of Europe, cheating on the fact that they 
were more experienced negotiators than the Croatians. The champions of the 
Magyar coalition claimed they were fighting for the national independence 
against the Habsburg dynasty and promised that the victory of Hungary would 
bring freedom to Southern Slavs as well. The Croatian liberals20 had at the time 
a firm conviction that independence could only be achieved by having harmonic 
relations with Hungary, rather than fighting it (Taylor 1990: 258).21 
 
This was a shudder to the Austrian policy of dualism and the Emperor him-
self, who refused both the idea of the Magyar language as a language of com-
mand in the Hungarian military and Dalmatia as a part of the Hungarian part of 
Croatia. The making of the Croatian-Serbian coalition at the end of 1905 and the 
parliamentary overthrow of the unpopular Magyar regime in Croatia, showed 
both Austria and Hungary that it was an extremely dangerous political group 
that threatened even the stable ways of operation of the Dual Monarchy.22 
 
As for the Yugoslav idea, it did not have any major importance among South 
Slavic nations and was used only as a topic of discussion among the intellectual 
elite. Despite this, the Yugoslav idea panicked both the Austrian court and the 
Magyars. The Croatian-Serbian coalition considerably helped the reconciliation 
of the Emperor and the magnates (Taylor 1990: 259).  
 
The Independent party tried to challenge the supreme command of the Em-
peror over the army once more in 1912 by starting new obstructions in the Par-
liament. This time, however, Tisza, then the President of the Hungarian Parlia-
ment, managed to promote legal provisions for the benefit of the mutual military 
                                                 
20 Ante Trumbi—the future president of the “Yugoslav Comittee” during the War—talked 
about the need for understanding among all peoples in the south of the monarchy, especially 
the Croats, Serbs and Italians of the seaboard. He expressed his hope that also the Hungarians, 
who were fighting for their own independence, would refuse to be still tools in foreign hands , 
and that they would enable the South Slavs to make an agreement with them on the new basis 
of “mutual fight for emancipation.” Krizman (not dated: 25). 
21 The promises to the Croatian-Serbian coalition were wasted. Ferenc Kossuth replied to the 
Rijeka suggestion for the cooperation in 1905: “We have been waiting for you with hope and 
love” to introduce a decree as a Habsburg Minister in 1907 that the Magyar language was the 
only official language at the Croatian railways, too (Taylor 1990: 260). 
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and introduce a new way of parliamentary operation, thus ending a long-term 
obstruction. Tisza was the actual regent of Hungary from that time until 1917, 
when the new Emperor Carl thanked him for his services as the Prime Minister 
of the Hungarian government (Redlich 1929: 407). Although Tisza managed to 
solve the crisis with the Austrian court and break his political opponents, he did 
not manage to solve the issue of nationalities in Hungary in a decisive moment, 
which would prove to be fatal for the existence of the Dual Monarchy.  
6. Conclusion 
The political crises that occurred in Austria and Hungary at the beginning of 20th 
century were primarily caused by civil nationalism—in Austria, a result of in-
dustrial development, and in Hungary, a result of the decay of agriculture. The 
crisis in Hungary was incited when the Magyar landowners—magnates—
requested that the Magyar language become the language of command in Hun-
garian units within the Austro-Hungarian army. The question of language in this 
case was in no way a cultural or linguistic problem. The Magyar language was 
not only subordinate to German, but had a superior status relative to other peo-
ples’ languages in Hungary due to the policies of Magyarization in Hungary. 
The language question, in this case, was exclusively a political question, with 
the aim to enable the Magyars to make the Hungarian army another powerful 
means of Magyarization in non-Magyar parts of Hungary. It was the fear that 
non-Magyar peoples of Hungary would see their chance for national affirmation 
within or outside the existing borders during the Magyar fight for Hungarian in-
dependence. This prevented the Magyar nationalists from claims for complete 
separation from the Austrian part of the Monarchy.  
 
The attack upon the unitary army was also an attack upon the Emperor Fran-
cis Joseph I as the commanding leader of the army; after all, military issues were 
of the utmost importance for both the Emperor and the heir to the throne, Fran-
cis Ferdinand. The Emperor knew that the Monarchy was necessary for “ruling 
peoples” if they wanted to maintain their hegemony and upper-class ways and 
that he could make them compliant by withholding support. The Emperor op-
posed the enthusiastic fervor of the Magyar nationalist magnates by the an-
nouncement of the new electoral law that would annul the Magyar hegemony 
over non-Magyar peoples in Hungary. He found his ally in the Liberal party 
headed by István Tisza. Tisza was undoubtedly a Magyar patriot who wanted to 
acquire the biggest concessions for Hungarians from the Emperor; but he never-
 
 
               369
13.2 (2012): 351-371 
theless did not want to jeopardize the dualistic structure that meant not only a 
privileged position in Hungary but also guaranteed a major influence over the 
general policies of the Monarchy. 
 
The announcement of the new electoral law was just a means of breaking 
down the Magyar nationalists. When the goal was achieved, both the electoral 
reform and the revision of the Ausgleich were abandoned. Both parties had good 
reason to do so. The unsafe position of the Crown in Hungary was primarily 
based upon the common interests of the nobility, the magnates, business and in-
dustrial upper classes in both parts of the Monarchy. This was why the introduc-
tion of the general right to vote would radically change the political situation be-
cause the majority vote would primarily be in the hands of petty farmers and 
workers of non-Magyar origin. Such a radical restructuring of power could not 
be carried out not only because the dark shadow of the future war was hanging 
over Europe, but also because it was obvious that many of the Austro-Hungarian 
nationalities hoped for the fulfillment of their national aspirations outside of the 
borders of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This was why the Emperor aban-
doned the implementation of the general right to vote in Hungary, i.e. he was led 
by direct political interests, despite the fact that a law like this one would have 
become, under the favorable political circumstances which sadly were not pre-
sent, the future foundation, not for the destruction, but for the protection of the 
Monarchy. 
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JEZIK KAO POLITIKO PITANJE:  
SLUAJ ZAPOVJEDNOG JEZIKA U AUSTROUGARSKOJ VOJSCI  
 
Rasprava prikazuje politiku krizu dualizma u višenacionalnoj Austro-Ugraskoj izazvanu ja-
anjem politike opozicije maarskih magnata u Ugarskom parlamentu. Potakli su je krupni 
veleposjednici-magnati sa zahtjevom da se u ugarsku vojsku uvede maarski kao zapovjedni 
jezik. Taj zahtjev je implicirao razdvajanje zajednike vojske i osporavanje zajednikog vr-
hovnog zapovjednika cara Franje Josipa. Pitanje maarskog jezika je zbog toga bilo prven-
stveno politiko pitanje, koje je u krajnjoj konsekvenci znailo daljnje slabljenje veza sa za-
padnom polovicom monarhije do potpunog ugarskog otcjepljenja, ali i mogunost daljnje ma-
arizacije ostalih nacionalnosti. Car se tome suprotstavio najavom novog izbornog zakona ko-
jim bi maarska manjina izgubila pravlast nad nemaarskom veinom u Ugarskoj. Podršku je 
dobio od liberalne stranke na elu s Istvánom Tiszom koji je dobro procjenio da dualizam pr-
venstveno štiti maarske interese u Ugarskoj. Strah od novog izbornog zakona otrijeznio je i 
maarske nacionaliste pa su odustali od revizije austrougarske Nagodbe, a Car je nakon toga 
odustao i od provedbe zakona o opem pravu glasa u Ugarskoj, voen neposrednim politi-
kim interesima iako bi upravo takav zakon pod odreenim povoljnim politikim okolnostima, 
kojih na žalost nije bilo, mogao u perspektivi postati temelj, ne za rušenje, ve za ouvanje 
Austro-Ugarske.  
 
Kljune rijei: Austrougarska nagodba; car Franjo Josip; Istvan Tisza; austrougarska vojska; 
zapovjedni jezik u austrougarskoj vojsci; izborni zakon u Ugarskoj. 
 
